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Abstract
The question this paper addresses is how the market structure evolves due to
innovative activities when ﬁrms’ level of technological competence is valuable for
more than one project. The focus of the work is the analysis of the eﬀect of learning-
by-doing and organizational forgetting in R&D on ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate. A
dynamic step-by-step innovation model with history dependency is developed. Firms
can accumulate knowledge by investing in R&D. As a benchmark without knowledge
accumulation it is shown that relaxing the usual assumption of imposed imitation
yields additional strategic eﬀects. Therefore, the leader’s R&D eﬀort increases with
the gap as she is trying to avoid competition in the future. When ﬁrms gain expe-
rience by performing R&D the resulting eﬀect of knowledge induces technological
leaders to rest on their laurels which allows followers to catch up. Contrary to the
benchmark case the leader’s innovation eﬀort declines with the lead. This causes an
equilibrium where the incentives to innovate are highest when competition is most
intense.
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11 Introduction
Innovation is an instrument for competitive advantage and often seen as one or even the
engine for growth. Therefore, it is crucial to understand its determinants. Competition
and innovation are intimately connected. This relation is twofold. On the one hand incen-
tives to innovate are driven by the competitive situation. On the other hand successful
innovations aﬀect and thus change the market structure. Due to this interdependency
the impact of market structure on innovation can only be assessed if the converse di-
rection – i.e., the changes in market structure caused by innovations – is accounted for.
Hence, an analysis of the evolution of market structure due to innovations is best done
by means of a dynamic framework.
The link between product market competition and innovation has been studied for a
long time. The classic contributions of Schumpeter and Arrow shaped the corresponding
polar positions of competition hindering innovation (often attributed to Schumpeter)
on the one hand and competition spurring innovation (often attributed to Arrow) on
the other hand. Closely connected to the question whether incentives to innovate are
increasing or decreasing with more intense market competition is the question on the
endogenous evolution of the market. Leaving aside changes in the number of ﬁrms (due
to entry, exit or mergers and acquisitions), this reduces to the question on the evolution
of diﬀerences between incumbent ﬁrms. Is one ﬁrm becoming more and more eﬃcient
leaving other ﬁrms behind or do we see neck-and-neck competition? Casual observations
and empirical evidence suggest a process of action-reaction in markets, i.e., market lead-
ership is constantly changing hands. In theoretical analyses diﬀerent modeling strategies
lead to widely diﬀering conclusions.1
However, most of this literature seems to leave out some important aspects. It neglects
that past experience in R&D usually has an impact on current success. Considering
only one innovation project or several projects separately omits the fact that a level of
technological competence may be valuable for following projects. On the one hand, the
success in preceding projects helps in securing income. Beyond that, the pure experience
of these projects improves performance in other projects. This is due to experience,
learning-by-doing, users’ feedback etc.
Our approach tries to identify the eﬀect of experience in R&D in a stylized model
designed to capture the essentials of the problem.
We develop a dynamic model with history dependency. History aﬀects market op-
portunities, i.e., previous actions and outcomes determine the range of available actions
and outcomes. This is modeled in a way that a ﬁrm’s investment in R&D does not
only increase the chance of making a discovery, but additionally increases the knowledge
stock.2 This knowledge stock is a measure of ﬁrm’s past R&D eﬀort and allows to model
learning, i.e., ﬁrm’s past experiences add to its current capabilities, and organizational
1A brief review of literature is provided at the end of this section.
2This way of modeling is based upon the work of Doraszelski (2003).
2forgetting. Learning-by-doing in R&D has been observed in many empirical works. In
practice learning may occur when the innovation activities of a ﬁrm are adjusted due to
past experiences or when innovation projects are cumulative, i.e., sequential and building
on each other. An example would be an investment in laboratory equipment which could
be used for other than the current project or gained experience of the researchers. Orga-
nizational forgetting in R&D on the other hand is a phenomenon that has been shown
in more recent studies.3 Sticking to the idea of knowledge capturing the experience of
the workers, organizational forgetting would be the result of turnover and layoﬀs.4
As described, ﬁrms’ continuous investment in R&D creates the permanent possibility
of a successful innovation. These innovations come in successive steps, i.e., a step has to
be completed to proceed. Due to the ”step-by-step” innovations a technological laggard
must ﬁrst catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for technological
leadership in the future. This in turn implies that if we do not see a process of increasing
dominance then every once in a while competition will be neck-and-neck and therefore
the escape competition eﬀect will be strongest.5 With respect to the product market,
we assume the industry to be characterized by a duopoly where ﬁrms are competing in
prices. The incumbent ﬁrms simultaneously engage in R&D in order to decrease their
relative costs.
The main research focus of the model where history and dynamics are essential is the
eﬀect of experience on the ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in innovation activities. How does
this eﬀect inﬂuence the evolution of market structure over time? What are the eﬀects
of competition in innovation on market structure? Does one ﬁrm become increasingly
dominant by being more successful in R&D, i.e., do we see a process of increasing dom-
inance, or is there a process of action reaction, in which market leadership is constantly
changing hands? Above all we wish to discover when competition in innovation is most
intense.
Starting with the benchmark case without learning we show that relaxing the usual
assumption of imposing imitation adds strategic eﬀects. Therefore, without the exoge-
nous possibility of immediate imitation leader’s R&D eﬀort is increasing with the lead
while laggard’s eﬀort is decreasing. The industry’s leader is trying to avoid competition
in the future while the reduced prospect of moving ahead diminishes incentives for the
follower. Nevertheless, leaders always invest less and hence a process of action reaction
results.
Allowing for knowledge accumulation adds another eﬀect. If one ﬁrm has accumu-
lated enough knowledge, its chances to successfully innovate are increased and therefore
3See for example Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) and Benkard (2000).
4Note that learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting in R&D is not the same as learning-by-
doing and organizational forgetting in production which is a well established approach in literature (see
e.g. Cabral & Riordan, 1994, 1997). In contrast to the latter, in this framework ﬁrms learn by doing
research and development not by producing.
5This escape competition motive has been pointed out in previous theoretical work on innovation, for
example by Mookherjee and Ray (1991).
3further R&D eﬀort is less rewarding. The leading ﬁrm can aﬀord to rest on its laurels
and hence, in steady state the ﬁrm invests less the higher the technological lead. The
knowledge eﬀect outweighs the increased incentive for the leader to innovate in order to
avoid competition. This may induce the follower to catch up. With respect to product
market competition our ﬁndings are in line with Arrow’s position of competition spurring
innovation. In our framework we clearly ﬁnd that due to the eﬀect of knowledge accu-
mulation the incentives to perform R&D are increasing with the intensity of competition.
As mentioned earlier, the relation between competition and innovation has been
studied for decades and hence literature on this issue is very extensive. However, neither
theoretical nor empirical research has led to a clear result on this link.
In empirical literature some support for the theory that predictions are highly spe-
ciﬁc to characteristics of innovations and the mechanism to protect the value created by
new technologies can be found. One reason why empirical studies have not generated
clear conclusions about the relationship might be a failure of many of these studies to ac-
count for diﬀerent market and technological conditions (see for example Cohen and Levin
(1989) and Gilbert (2006) for surveys). We will discuss this issue in the lights of the re-
sults of our model in the respective sections.
Regarding economic theory, in addition to Sutton’s work on industrial market struc-
ture (Sutton (1991, 1998, 2007)), the voluminous literature dealing with static models
(see for example Belleﬂamme and Vergari (2006) and Vives (2006)), this paper is espe-
cially related to the literature on dynamic evolution of oligopoly.
Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993) present a work that analyzes whether the gap
between two ﬁrms in a model of dynamic competition tends to increase or decrease.
While modeling the gap in terms of an abstract (bounded) state of competition parame-
ter without modeling the product market explicitly they ﬁnd that the gap tends to evolve
into the direction where joint payoﬀs are greater. This most often results in a process of
increasing dominance. Cabral and Riordan (1994) provide further indications of increas-
ing dominance. Segal and Whinston (2005) study the eﬀects of antitrust in a dynamic
R&D model based on ”winner-take-all” competition. Ericson and Pakes (1995) develop
a comprehensive model of industry behavior with ﬁrm speciﬁc sources of uncertainty.
The work is intended to be a framework for empirical analysis and more considered as
a model for industry dynamics due to entry, exit and mergers.
Articles analyzing industry evolution when there is learning-by-doing like
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) and Cabral and Riordan (1994, 1997) usually simply model
cost reduction as a function of output decisions. Basically, ﬁrms learn by producing not
by researching and developing. That means it becomes less costly for the leader to gain
higher proﬁts as the lead widens. With this way of modeling R&D is complementary with
production. Besides, organizational forgetting can not be modeled in these frameworks.
Our work is also related to the literature on patent races (see Reinganum (1989) for
an early summery). Due to the endpoint that players are aiming for, usually the property
4of increasing dominance results. This characteristic remains in multistage race models,
where several stages are introduced into a patent race, as there is still a deﬁnite end.6
To the best of our knowledge Doraszelski (2003) was the ﬁrst to introducing knowledge
accumulation into patent races. However, he does not model product market competition.
Regarding dynamic step-by-step innovation, our work is most closely re-
lated to and extends the works of Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006). Although our model builds on these papers, it also dif-
fers from them in signiﬁcant ways. Most importantly, our main research regards the
eﬀect of experience in R&D. Therefore, we extend the model to learning-by-doing and
organizational forgetting. Besides, we do not imply the strong assumptions on imita-
tion as Aghion et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006). These authors assume
the follower at least catches up with the frontier technology with one successful innova-
tion.7 Thus, in contrast to our model strategic incentives to perform R&D are absent.
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006) show numerically, based on the model of Aghion et al.
(2001), that optimal intellectual property rights policy provides more protection to ﬁrms
that are technologically more advanced as this policy strengthens the escape competition
eﬀect. Obviously, R&D by ﬁrms that are suﬃciently ahead is encouraged just as well as
eﬀort by companies with a limited lead because of their prospect of reaching levels of
gaps associated with higher protection. That is to say, the eﬀect of avoiding competition
that is absent in the basic model is introduced by means of intellectual property rights
policy.
Based on the work of Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and
Howitt (2005) analyze the relationship between product market competition and innova-
tion. However, they only allow for two possible states (one step behind and neck-to-neck).
In a related work H¨ orner (2004) develops a model allowing a ﬁrm to be an arbitrary num-
ber of steps ahead or behind. His contribution and the eﬀect of a ﬁrm being suﬃciently
far ahead suggests that an analysis ` a la Aghion et al. (2005) with only two possible
states leaves out some aspects. Unfortunately, H¨ orner does not model product market
competition.
Our work diﬀers from all of the above papers as we consider the eﬀects of learning-by-
doing and organizational forgetting in R&D with ﬁrms competing on the product market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 provides an analysis of optimal R&D when accumulation of knowledge is not
possible. In this section we also compare our result to the one of the related framework
of Aghion et al. (2001). Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium R&D investment when the
eﬀect of knowledge accumulation is at place and compares it with the benchmark case
6See for example Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985),
Grossman and Shapiro (1987), Harris and Vickers (1987), and Lippman and McCardle (1988).
7Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006) also consider the case where the follower might even be able to improve
over the frontier technology.
5without knowledge. Section 5 concludes while the Appendix contains the proofs of the
results stated in the text.
2 The Model
We consider an industry with two ex-ante symmetric ﬁrms i = 1,2 producing homoge-
neous goods.8 Firms’ costs of production depend on their technologies. A ﬁrm’s technol-
ogy is given by xi, and a ﬁrm produces output quantity y at cost ci(y) = ye−xi. Each
ﬁrm can continuously engage in R&D in order to improve its technology and thereby
decrease its relative cost. Innovative investment is denoted by zi. Innovations are uncer-
tain and come in successive steps. Hence, a step has to be completed to proceed. When
a ﬁrm moves one technical step ahead its technology increases by one.9
Investments in R&D increase the chance of a successful innovation, i.e., the chance
of moving one step ahead. Besides, there is another eﬀect of R&D. Firms accumulate
knowledge. A ﬁrm’s gathered knowledge is denoted by ki and evolves according to
dki
dt
= ˙ ki = u(zi) − δki. (1)
Here, ui is ﬁrm i’s rate of knowledge acquisition. We assume the rate of knowledge
acquisition to be a function of investment in R&D given by ui = u(zi) = (ηzi)
1
η so that
the cost incurring to acquire knowledge at rate ui is z(ui) = 1
ηu
η
i. The elasticity of the
cost function is measured by η > 1. Hence, the R&D-cost function is an increasing and
convex function. The depreciation rate of the knowledge stock is given by δ ≥ 0.
The more knowledge a ﬁrm has accumulated, the more successful – in expectation –
is the ﬁrm’s R&D. Hence, the distribution of a ﬁrm’s success times, given by the ﬁrm’s
hazard rate hi, does not only depend on the current investment zi but also on past
eﬀort measured by the knowledge stock ki.10 A ﬁrm moves one technical step ahead
with hazard rate
hi = λu(zi) + γkα
i . (2)
A ﬁrm’s hazard rate of successful innovation is the rate at which the discovery is made at
a certain point in time given that it has not been made before. The parameter λ measures
the eﬀectiveness of current eﬀort while γ measures the eﬀectiveness of past eﬀort. The
marginal impact of past R&D eﬀorts is determined by α. To exclude increasing returns
8Extending the derived results to the more general case of diﬀerentiated goods would be possible
at the cost of additional notation and a considerably higher complexity in derivation. As only minor
additional insights can be gained by such an extension as long as the degree of substitution is exogenous
we restrict attention to the case of perfect substitutes.
9The stepsize is arbitrarily set equal to one. As long as the size is exogenous and constant all re-
sults remain unchanged with a diﬀerent increment. However, allowing for diﬀerent possible stepsizes of
innovations may alter the outcome considerably.
10Note that due to this way of modeling we cannot interpret knowledge as capital in the usual way since
knowledge is not an input factor in production and knowledge as such does not inﬂuence the production
technology directly.
6to scale, we assume that α ≤ η holds. A ﬁrm’s technology follows a Poisson process
dxi(t) = 1 · dqi(t) where qi(t) is the underlying process with the non-constant hazard
rate hi(t).11
If γ > 0, the model allows for history dependency. Hence, R&D eﬀort for one
project is – by means of the gathered knowledge – valuable for the following projects.
This allows to model learning and organizational forgetting. In general, learning means
a ﬁrm’s past experiences add to its current capabilities. Organizational forgetting is
modeled as depreciation of knowledge. This implies that a ﬁrm’s recent experiences
are more important and valuable than older know-how. Organizational forgetting is
captured in the model by setting δ > 0.
Firms are assumed to be Bertrand competitors and maximize expected discounted
proﬁts. Demand at price p is given by y(p) = 1
p. The instantaneous proﬁt in Bertrand
equilibrium then only depends on the technology gap leaving the laggard j with nothing






1 − e−∆i(t) for ∆i(t) > 0,
0 for ∆i(t) ≤ 0.
On top of these proﬁts both ﬁrms have to pay their investment zi in R&D. Note
that even if the industry is leveled, i.e., ∆(t) ≡ |∆i(t)| = |∆j(t)| = 0, the situation
is not necessarily symmetric since ﬁrms may (and most often will) dispose of diﬀerent
knowledge stocks.
Figure 1 shows how the ﬁrm’s market proﬁt varies with the size of the lead ∆. It
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Figure 1: A ﬁrm’s proﬁt π as a function of its technological lead ∆.
shows that proﬁt increases slower the higher the lead already is, i.e.,
∂πi(·)
∂∆i > 0 and
11For detailed information on Poisson processes see Ross (2003).
12For the sake of readability throughout the rest of the paper we will denote ﬁrm i’s competitor by j,




< 0 for ∆i > 0. Thus, the motive of escape competition is potentially more
important for ﬁrms in the neck-and-neck state. On the other hand in an industry with
a large technological gap neither ﬁrm makes much immediate gain from innovating; the
leader is already earning almost the maximum possible proﬁt and the follower will still
earn nothing even if he catches up.
Firms are assumed to maximize expected discounted proﬁts with time preference
rate ρ ∈ [0,1). As ﬁrm i’s instantaneous proﬁt is πi(∆i,t), the ﬁrm’s objective function




(πi(∆i,τ) − zi(τ))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ. (3)
We next analyze the equilibrium research intensities. We assume that these equilib-
rium innovation rates are determined by the necessary conditions for a Markov-stationary
equilibrium (steady state fraction of states) in which each ﬁrm seeks to maximize ex-
pected discounted proﬁts. Hence, ﬁrm i maximizes its objective function (3) subject to
the evolution of the knowledge stocks (1) and the technologies (2).
3 Equilibrium without Acquisition of Knowledge
As a benchmark and starting point we analyze the extreme case, when there is no eﬀect
of knowledge and only current eﬀort counts. In this case the state variables are x1 and
x2. Due to the modeling approach we can use ∆i = xi − xj as the only state variable.
As we do not have to distinguish the impact of past and current eﬀort we can set λ
arbitrarily equal to one.
With this exclusion of knowledge our benchmark model is very similar to the one
of Aghion et al. (2001), but there is one crucial diﬀerence. Aghion et al. (2001) and
also Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006) assume that the laggard always catches up with the
industry’s leader with only one successful innovation no matter how big the gap is.
That means the R&D cost function of catching up is independent of the gap that has
to be bridged. Therefore, there is no strategic motive for performing R&D. The only
incentive for leaders to increase the industry’s gap results from the immediate increase
in proﬁt. On the long run being suﬃciently far ahead does not provide any competitive
advantage in future R&D. The converse is true for the follower, i.e., being far behind
is not disadvantageous for future competition. In fact, for followers the current gap is
irrelevant as it even does not inﬂuence product market proﬁts.
Contrarily, we assume the laggard has to catch up step-by-step.13 Hence, being suﬃ-
ciently far ahead provides advantages in future technological competition and strategic
eﬀects are at place to invest in R&D. This is the case for the laggard and the leader.
13A discussion on how realistic these assumptions are is given at the end of this section.
8Besides, in the framework of Aghion et al. (2001), the assumption on imitation is
expected to have similar eﬀects as knowledge accumulation, namely reducing innovation
incentives for leaders. When the follower has no possibility of imitating the leader’s
technology we are able to disentangle the knowledge eﬀect in the next section.
3.1 Optimal R&D Eﬀort
In this section we analyze some properties of the ﬁrms’ optimal eﬀort in R&D. For the
sake of simpliﬁcation we assume ﬁrms maximize over u instead of z. To solve for the
Markov-stationary equilibrium we use dynamic programming methods. This yields the
maximized Bellman equations:14
ρVi(∆i) =πi(∆i) − z(ui) + [Vi(∆i + 1) − Vi(∆i)]hi(ui(∆i))
+ [Vi(∆i − 1) − Vi(s)]hj(uj(∆i)). (4)
These equations state that the annuity value ρVi(∆i) of each ﬁrm i in industry state
∆i at any date t equals the current proﬁt ﬂow πi(∆i) − z(ui) plus the expected capital
gain [Vi(∆i + 1) − Vi(∆i)]hi(ui(∆i)) from moving one technological step forward plus
the expected capital loss [Vi(∆i − 1) − Vi(∆i)]hj(uj(∆i)) from having the competitor
stepping forward.
With λ = 1 and η = 2 we get the following relations of optimal R&D eﬀort:15
Lemma 1. Assuming η = 2, the optimal R&D eﬀort satisﬁes the following equations:




e + ρ2 + u(1)2 − ρ; (5)
2. For the industry’s leader with ∆ > 0:







+ (u(−∆ − 1) − ρ)
2 − 2u(∆ − 1)u(−∆) + u(∆ + 1)2;
(6)
3. For the follower with −∆ < 0:
u(−∆) =1






4 (u(∆ − 1) − ρ)
2 − u(−∆ − 1)u(∆) + u(−∆ + 1)2. (7)
Proof. See Appendix B.
14This result is derived in appendix A.
15For the sake of readability we will suppress the identity of the ﬁrm where not necessary.
9From Lemma 1 we cannot ﬁnd a closed form solution for optimal R&D eﬀort as
a function of the gap but under the assumption of ρ = 016 we can derive a pattern
regarding the optimal R&D investment:
Proposition 1. Assuming η = 2 and a time preference rate ρ = 0, ﬁrms’ optimal
behavior satisﬁes the following conditions:
• R&D investment is highest for a ﬁrm being one step behind and the eﬀort of the
laggard decreases with the gap, i.e., ∀∆ > 0 : z(−∆) > z(−∆ − 1).
• Investment of a laggard is always higher than that of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, i.e.,
∀∆ > 0 : z(−∆) > z(0).
• Investment of a leader increases with the gap, i.e., ∀∆ > 0 : z(∆) < z(∆ + 1).
• Investment of a leader is always smaller than that of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, i.e.,
∀∆ > 0 : z(∆) < z(0).
Proof. See Appendix B.17
The pattern resulting from the statements of proposition 1 is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
z
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Figure 2: Optimal R&D eﬀort subject to the ﬁrm’s gap.
16As shown by Dutta (1991), in a model like ours the assumption of zero discounting is not crucial
for the results. Besides, we were able to show numerically that the results basically hold with ρ > 0
in quality (with the additional feature that R&D investment eventually falls to zero). However, the
analytical derivation for the discounted problem is excessively more complex.
17Note, however, that this result is not necessarily the only possible pattern, i.e., it is not possible to
show uniqueness (see Appendix).
10We see that the R&D eﬀort of a ﬁrm being exactly one step behind provides the
highest incentive to perform R&D. When the laggard falls further behind, the usual
Schumpeterian eﬀect of a reduced prospect of moving ahead diminishes incentives.
The opposite is true for the leader. The incentive is lowest when being one step ahead
and increases when moving further ahead. The motive for this increasing eﬀort is not
the raise in immediate proﬁt (as this decreases with the lead) but the raise in expected
future proﬁt. When the leader moves ahead she decreases the probability that the lag-
gard catches up within a certain time and hence she increases the expected duration of
maintaining positive proﬁts.
The greatest R&D eﬀort to enhance the leading edge technology is made when both
companies dispose of this technology, i.e., in a neck-and-neck industry. This result is due
to the escape-competition eﬀect. It is clear that neck-and-neck ﬁrms innovate to escape
the strong competition on the product market.
Overall, the laggard is trying hard to catch up and always invests more than
the leader which induces a process of action-reaction. This result is in line with
empirical evidence especially found in high-tech industries. For example in a market for
computer disk drives Lerner (1997) obtained that the market leader was less likely and
took longer to introduce a better drive than did ﬁrms whose technologies lagged the
market leader. Khanna (1995) ﬁnds similar results for the high-end computer industry.
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) ﬁnd as well that the status of being a challenger has a
positive and signiﬁcant impact while being a defensive ﬁrm has a negative impact on
the incentives to innovate.
Interestingly, our result quite diﬀers from the result in Aghion et al. (2001). In their
model the leader’s eﬀort decreases while the follower’s eﬀort increases with the indus-
try’s gap. This diﬀerence in outcome is due to the mentioned diﬀerence in modeling:
Aghion et al. (2001) assume that the R&D cost function of catching up is independent
of the technological gap to be made up. Due to this strong assumption the only incentive
for the industry’s leader to innovate is a further increase in proﬁt while in our model
strategic eﬀects are at place. By widening the technological gap the industry’s leader
makes it more diﬃcult for the follower to catch up. As a result, we see two characteris-
tics of the escape-competition eﬀect. On the one hand ﬁrms in a neck-and-neck industry
perform R&D to escape the competition while ﬁrms that are technologically advanced
innovate to avoid competition in the future. In this framework without imitation we can
subdivide the escape competition eﬀect into the basic eﬀect at work in a neck-and-neck
state and the avoid competition eﬀect at work in a staggered industry.18
A similar incentive scheme holds for the follower. In the model ` a la Aghion et al.
(2001) the follower can always catch up immediately and battle for industry leadership.
Therefore, the described Schumpeterian eﬀect is almost absent. Here in contrast, a fol-
18It is exactly the strengthening of this avoid competition eﬀect that drives the results of
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006).
11lower being suﬃciently far behind has to invest a large amount into R&D to get into the
position of being able to battle for market leadership. Hence, the incentive to invest is
decreasing with the gap for the follower and increasing for the leader and the described
incentive scheme seems to be exactly opposite to Aghion et al. (2001).
However, this is not the entire story. In fact, our model does to some extent incor-
porate the model of Aghion et al. (2001). As in their model there is no strategic eﬀect
of competition in innovation, our states ∆i ∈ {−1,0,1} contain the basic features of
their framework. Considering only these states leaves out the eﬀect of changes in the
leader’s proﬁt, of course, but can still be used to illustrate the basic result. With a gap
not bigger than one, the leader can catch up immediately as it is the case in the model
of Aghion et al. (2001). Taking only these states into account, we ﬁnd the same result,
namely a decrease in R&D with the gap. Strategic eﬀects come into place when the lead
widens.
Thus, we can conclude that the incentive scheme resulting in Aghion et al. (2001) is
mainly a result of the strong imitation assumption which even Aghion et al. consider as
not very realistic and a point for extension. Obviously, our extreme case is not the most
realistic scenario either as this would be in between the two extreme cases. However,
we were able to show the additional eﬀects when strategic motives to perform R&D
come into place. The outcome of a more realistic framework where imitation is possible
to some extent would still be driven by the displayed strategic incentives. The impact
of these incentives, however, would depend on how catching up with the leading edge
technology is possible. This is the realm of intellectual property rights policy.
3.2 Steady State Industry Structure
With the results derived so far we will now analyze the industry’s structure in steady
state. As the leader’s R&D eﬀort is always smaller than the laggard’s eﬀort the ﬁrms
will not drift apart in expectation and a steady state exists.19
Let µ∆ denote the steady-state probability of the industry showing a technological
gap ∆. As we do not consider knowledge acquisition, a ﬁrm’s eﬀort u(∆) equals the
transition rate. Stationarity implies that for any state ∆ the ﬂow of industries into this
state ∆ must equal the ﬂow out. Consider ﬁrst state 0 (neck-and-neck). During time
interval dt, in µ1u(−1)dt in industries with technological gap 1 the follower catches up
with the leader, hence, the total ﬂow of industries into state 0 is µ1u(−1)dt. On the
other hand, in µ02u(0)dt in neck-and-neck industries one of the two ﬁrms acquires a
lead, hence the total ﬂow of industries out of state 0 is 2µ0u(0)dt. Thus in steady state
2µ0u(0) = µ1u(−1).
19See Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006) for a formal proof on the existence of a steady state.
12Replicating the same reasoning for all states yields
µ1(u(1) + u(−1)) = 2µ0u(0) + µ2u(−2),
µ2(u(2) + u(−2)) = µ1u(1) + µ3u(−3),
and in general
µ∆(u(∆) + u(−∆)) = µ∆−1u(∆ − 1) + µ∆+1u(−∆ − 1) for all ∆ > 1. (8)
Using these conditions, it is easy to see, that
µ∆u(∆) = µ∆+1u(−∆ − 1) for all ∆ ≥ 1 (9)
has to hold.
With the derived stationary conditions it is possible to determine the steady
state growth rate. The growth rate of the industry is asymptotically given as g =
lim∆t→∞
∆lny
∆t with y as industry’s output.20
The quantity sold by the industry as a whole grows at rate e with every step the
follower catches up. Thus, over any long time interval, the logarithmic change in output
can be approximated by the number of times the follower catches up one step over the
time interval. The asymptotic frequency of a catch up equals the steady state ﬂow of the
industry from state ∆ to state ∆−1, which in turn equals the fraction µ∆ of industries
in state ∆ times the transition rate that the follower catches up one step. This is given
by u(−∆). Hence, g =
 
∆≥1 µ∆u(−∆) can be written as




using the stationary conditions (9). Equation (10) states the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The steady state growth rate in a step-by-step innovation model
equals the frequency of frontier innovation, i.e., innovations by industry leaders and
neck-and-neck ﬁrms, which advance the industry’s frontier technology.
This proposition shows how neck-and-neck rivalry promotes growth. When an in-
dustry is neck-and-neck there are two ﬁrms trying to advance the industry’s frontier
technology, whereas in all other states just one ﬁrm is trying. Thus, even if all the ef-
forts were the same, technology would advance in average twice as fast in neck-and-neck
industries as in any other.
20Although we do not model an entire closed economy and cannot provide a general equilibrium
analysis, our model can easily be transferred into such a framework. Thus, we can draw conclusions
on the economy’s growth rate from the growth rate of the industry or sector. In a general equilibrium
framework with an economy consisting of a mass of 1 identical industries, the deﬁned industry growth
rate g equals the growth rate of the economy
d ln Y
dt with Y as the economy’s aggregate output.
13Moreover, as the R&D eﬀort of a neck-and-neck ﬁrm is always greater than that
of a leader such an industry grows more than twice as fast as other industries. Note
that the described characteristic of the steady state growth rate is not a consequence
of the no-knowledge assumption but rather the result of any similar step-by-step model
showing a steady state.
4 The Eﬀect of Knowledge
Now, we analyze the situation where knowledge is introduced, i.e., the market is modeled
as described in section 2. The industry’s state will be denoted as s ≡ (∆1,k1,k2).
Using dynamic programming methods for the problem given by (3) subject to (1)
and (2) yields the maximized Bellman equations for the ﬁrms:




(u(zi(s)) − δki) +
∂Vi(s)
∂kj
(u(zj(s)) − δkj). (11)
Again, the annuity value ρVi(s) of ﬁrm i in industry state s at date t equals the current
proﬁt ﬂow πi(∆i) − zi(s) plus the expected capital gain [Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hi(zi(s))
from moving one technological step forward plus the expected capital loss
[Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hj(zj(s)) from having the competitor stepping forward. Now,
two other terms are added, namely the capital gain from increased knowledge
∂Vi(s)
∂ki (u(zi(s)) − δki) and the capital loss
∂Vi(s)
∂kj (u(zj(s)) − δkj) from the competitor’s
acquired knowledge.
To apply the dynamic programming methods we make another simplifying assump-
tion, namely that investment in R&D does not immediately inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s probability
of success. Hence, the parameter λ is assumed to be zero. This yields the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 3. If investment in R&D has no immediate inﬂuence on the chances of
a successful innovation, i.e., when λ = 0, ﬁrms do not immediately react when a jump
in the ﬁrm’s own or the competitor’s technology occurs, i.e., ﬁrm’s optimal investment
does not immediately change.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result is not very surprising and a direct consequence of the assumption of λ = 0.
Since ﬁrms cannot react directly on technology jumps they do not and hence investment
in R&D does not jump when technology does.
And there is another consequence of assuming λ = 0. A steady state fails to exist.
A stationary Markov chain would imply that for any state s the ﬂow of industries into
state s must equal the ﬂow out. This again implies hazard rates and hence knowledge
stock to immediately react on technological jumps which cannot be the case in this
14framework. However, we can still determine the optimal rule describing the evolution
of investment under ﬁrms’ optimal behavior. Using the result of proposition 3 in the
dynamic programming approach yields:
Lemma 2. If investment in R&D has no immediate inﬂuence on the chances of a













with Φ(∆) > 0,
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ < 0 for ∆ > 0 and
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ > 0 for ∆ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We can immediately and clearly see from (12) what the direct eﬀect of knowledge
is: The more knowledge a ﬁrm has acquired the smaller is the growth rate of optimal
investment. This illustrates the eﬀect of resting on one’s laurels. Firms acquire knowledge
by investing in R&D. Hence, the knowledge stock grows and the more it grows the less
do ﬁrms invest since they can aﬀord to be based on this stock. Although knowledge
as such does not enter in the production function, knowledge is productive in terms of
expectations and therefore valuable for ﬁrms.
The eﬀect of knowledge in the long run is more diﬃcult to assess. As zi(s) on the
right hand side depends both on a ﬁrm’s own and the competitor’s knowledge, equation
(12) does not immediately tell the long run eﬀects of knowledge on the evolution of the
market.21
Besides, there is another eﬀect of investment, namely technological progress.
R&D eﬀort leads to ﬁrms moving technologically ahead. Thus, by investing in R&D
and thereby accumulating knowledge in expectation ﬁrms also increase their tech-
nology. We know that
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ < 0 for ∆ > 0. Therefore, from (12) it is clear that
investment grows faster the higher the technological lead. For the follower we know
that
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ > 0 for ∆ < 0. Hence, the ﬁrm that is behind invests more the closer
it gets. This shows again the eﬀects described for the benchmark case (cf. proposition 1).
To see how these eﬀects inﬂuence each other in the long run we would need to assess
the overall dynamic properties of the model in terms of steady states. Unfortunately, as
∆ follows a stochastic process a steady state does not exist. However, we can for the
moment assume ∆ to be constant to get an idea of the dynamics. Using equation (12)
we are able to analyze ”temporary steady states”. This approach is closely related to
literature on natural volatility.22
21Note that diﬀerent to technology levels there is no direct eﬀect of the competitor’s knowledge on
optimal investment.
22This relatively new, mainly macroeconomic approach jointly analyzes short-run instability and
long-run growth due to innovations. Important papers in this strand of literature include for example
Bental and Peled (1996), Matsuyama (1999), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), Maliar and Maliar (2004),
15From (12) it is clear that besides the trivial temporary steady state O with zi = 0
and ki = 0, there is the locus dzi













From (1) we have the locus dki
dt = ˙ ki = u(zi) − δki = 0. These two loci partition
the space {k,z}23 into diﬀerent regions. Temporary steady states are identiﬁed by inter-
sections between loci. The properties of steady states depend on the shape of the locus
˙ z = 0 and this again on the marginal impact of knowledge determined by α and the
elasticity of the cost function η. In either case the loci partition the space {k,z} into
four regions. We obtain one intersection of loci (1) and (13) for positive values of z and
k and hence one nontrivial steady state point P. The situation is illustrated in ﬁgure
3. The graph on the left shows the phase diagram for the hazard rate being a concave
function of knowledge (α < 1) while the right diagram shows the case where the hazard
rate is a convex function of knowledge (η > α > 1). The dynamics are summarized by
vertical and horizontal arrows.
0 ￿ k￿























Figure 3: Convergence to the temporary steady state P for α < 1 and η > α > 1.
For α < 1 the function described by (13) is decreasing for all k > 0 while the function
given by ˙ k = 0 has a positive and increasing slope. Therefore, we obviously obtain one
intersection and hence one nontrivial steady state point P.
If η > α > 1, the function given by (13) is increasing with a decreasing slope while
the function given by ˙ k = 0 has an increasing slope.24 Furthermore it is easy to show
that the function given by ˙ z = 0 is steeper for suﬃciently small values of k. Therefore,
we obtain two intersections and hence two steady state points O and P, where O is again
Gabaix (2005), and Haruyama (2005). In these macroeconomic models, however, the motivation for ﬂuc-
tuations in aggregate growth and the link to long run growth are important issues that are irrelevant to
our model.
23Again, we suppress the identiﬁcation of the identity of the ﬁrm.
24The hazard rate being a linear (α = 1) function of knowledge is a special case where the function
described by (13) is a horizontal line. The results are similar to the described cases and therefore not
given in detail.
16the trivial steady state. Only for the special case of α = η just the trivial steady state
exists.25
It is easy to see that in all cases points converge towards the stationary equilibrium P
at (k∗,z∗). Hence, the equilibrium P is always reached and stable as long as ∆ does not
jump. Note that the described results simultaneously hold for both ﬁrms in the economy,
i.e., as long as ∆ does not jump, knowledge and R&D investment for leader and follower
converge to two diﬀerent steady states.
If one ﬁrm successfully implements an innovation, ∆ jumps. If the leader innovates,
the technological gap increases. This causes the line ˙ z = 0 for the leader to decrease
while it increases for the follower. Hence, the new temporary steady state towards points
converge is left and below the old one for the leader and right and above for the follower.
The converse is true if the follower innovates. These dynamics are illustrated for η > α >
1 in ﬁgure 4. The new loci are shown by the dashed lines. We see that both steady state
investment and knowledge decrease for the leader when being successful. By contrast,
they increase for the follower.
0 ￿ k￿
0 ￿ z ￿
z
k
0 ´￿ z ￿
0 ￿ k￿
0 ￿ z ￿
z
k
0 ´￿ z ￿
Figure 4: Temporary steady states before and after a successful innovation by the leader
when η > α > 1. The leader’s ﬂuctuation can be seen on the left, the follower’s on the
right phase diagram.
Subsequently, the economy approaches towards the new steady states until another
jump in technology occurs which might move ﬁrms towards a former steady state again.
These cyclical equilibria are described by a ”Sisyphus-type” behavior. Investment and
knowledge approach the steady state but are thrown back due to the implementation of
a new successful innovation.
The resulting investment z∗













We now proceed to the comparative statics on z∗
i w.r.t. the technological gap. As






η the two functions are identical and we
have an inﬁnite number of steady states.










This can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. As long as α < η, the leader’s and follower’s temporary steady state
investment in R&D is decreasing with the technological gap.
In contrast to the benchmark case, now ceteris paribus steady state investment for
the leader is decreasing with the technological lead. She has accumulated enough know-
ledge such that her chances to successfully innovate and to maintain positive proﬁts are
suﬃciently high and further R&D eﬀort is less rewarding.
On the other hand, the follower invests more the closer he gets. His incentive scheme
is basically the same as in the benchmark case, i.e., the reduced prospect of moving
ahead diminishes incentives to innovate when the gap increases.
Comparing this result with the one of the benchmark case we can clearly identify
the eﬀect of knowledge: As investment in R&D is never lost the leading ﬁrm can aﬀord
to scale back its R&D eﬀort. These results might cause the described process of action
reaction. The leader rests on her laurels which allows the follower to catch up. The
result is a market where leadership is constantly changing hands.
Obviously, struggle is ﬁercest when ﬁrms are shoulder to shoulder and the intensity
of competition is higher the closer the technologies of the ﬁrms. Thus, the incentive to
invest in innovation is increasing with the intensity of competition. This result can be in-
terpreted in the light of the debate between the polar positions attributed to Schumpeter
and Arrow, concerning the relationship between the intensity of market competition and
the incentives to invest in R&D. Here, the position of Arrow of competition spurring
innovation ﬁnds support.
This result is supported by empirical work. Especially in other than high-tech indus-
tries, studies show some tendency for increased R&D investment when competition is
intense (see for example Culbertson and Mueller (1985), Lunn (1986), Lunn and Martin
(1986), MacDonald (1994), Nickell (1996), and Tang (2006)). In his survey, Gilbert (2006)
concludes that ”there is some evidence that competition promotes innovation when the
measure of competition is an index of proximity of ﬁrms to a technological frontier.”
This is the case in our theoretical framework.
Hence, we have found that the result in the pure knowledge case of this section is in
line with empirical evidence from other than high-tech industries while our result in the
18benchmark case of the previous section is supported by ﬁndings from high-tech industries.
This suggests that experience is of less importance in high-tech R&D, which might be
true as in these industries methods and processes change rapidly such that technology
and thus knowledge of this technology is outdated very fast. Casual observations support
this view as constant changes of leadership – even involving new entrants – are very
common. This could not be the case if experience was essential.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a dynamic step-by-step innovation framework where ﬁrms’
level of innovative competence is valuable for more than one R&D project in order to
investigate the impact of knowledge on ﬁrms’ optimal innovative eﬀort and the evolution
of industrial market structure.
The focus has been the general questions of whether the ﬁrm that is currently in
the lead tends to increase its advantage over its rival, or whether there is a tendency
for the rival to catch-up. We attempted to determine the eﬀect of learning-by-doing and
organizational forgetting in R&D on ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate.
In order to address these questions we analyzed a model where the state of competi-
tion is represented in one dimension. In the model ﬁrms engage in step-by-step innova-
tion. Leaders can innovate in order to widen the technological gap between themselves
and the follower. This does not only increase their proﬁt but also decreases the proba-
bility of getting caught up by the follower. The follower on the other hand innovates to
ﬁrst catch up step-by-step with and then to surpass the leader. Firms acquire knowledge
by engaging in R&D projects. This knowledge is valuable not only for the current but
also for future projects. Hence, successful projects provide a competitive advantage on
the product market and in innovation activities.
In order to assess the eﬀect of knowledge, we ﬁrst analyzed the case where knowledge
is worthless for R&D. As the possibility of imitation for the follower as well as the eﬀect
of knowledge accumulation induce the leader to invest less in R&D the higher the gap,
we exclude the possibility of imitation so to disentangle these two eﬀects. Besides, the
exclusion of imitation adds strategic motives to competition in innovation. We found
that a leader in an economy without the possibility of imitation increases her innovative
eﬀort the further away she moves as she is trying to avoid competition in the future.
Introducing the possibility of gaining experience by innovative activities adds the
knowledge eﬀect which outweighs the avoid competition eﬀect and the leader’s R&D
eﬀort decreases with the lead. She rests on her laurels which in turn might induce the
follower to catch up. Besides, we see that when knowledge is at place the incentives to
innovate are higher the higher the intensity of competition. Hence, competition spurs
innovation.
The main aim of the paper has been to understand the incentives generated by
learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting and how these incentives inﬂuence the
19evolution of the market.
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings are based on two extreme cases of an analytical model. It
would be interesting to see whether the results of the model in general are in line with
our special case results. This could be done by means of a numerical analysis. Intuitively,
one would assume that results of such a more general analysis would be a mixture of
the two given scenarios. Depending on the parameters determining the impact of past
and current R&D eﬀort, the result would either tend more into the direction of the
benchmark case of section 3 or the pure knowledge case of section 4.
Furthermore, investigating the impact of intellectual property rights policy could be
a revealing task. This could even be done without considering knowledge. On the one
hand, a less protective policy would make catching up easier and the industry would
more often show a neck-and-neck state in which the growth rate is highest. On the other
hand, such a policy would diminish the Schumpeterian eﬀect for the follower and the
avoid competition eﬀect for the leader. This would decrease their incentives to invest in
R&D and decrease growth rates in other than neck-and-neck states. Hence, the overall
outcome is not clear.
It would also be interesting to check the robustness of the results with respect to
diﬀerent models of industry dynamics, i.e., diﬀerent sources of ﬁrms’ variety like the
degree of substitution, extent of ﬁxed costs etc.
Another natural extension would be to allow for entry and exit. Exit would bound the
industry’s gap and encourages predatory behavior. This would be a kind of an endpoint
eﬀect and rise the incentives to move ahead for leaders. Allowing for (re-) entry by
making it possible to copy the incumbent’s technology at certain cost might promote
eﬀorts by the incumbent to gain so much experience that relative high R&D cost for a
new ﬁrm deter entry. In such an extension the modeling of imitation and licensing would
be crucial. Thus, the concept of knowledge accumulation introduces a new strategic
aspect to competition.
20Appendix
A Dynamic Programming and the General Model
To solve for the Markov-stationary equilibrium we use dynamic programming methods and
therefore derive the Bellman equations. Deﬁning the optimal programs for the ﬁrms i = 1,2
as Vi(s) ≡ max{zi(τ)} Πi(s(t)) s.t. the evolutions of the state variables s ≡ (k1,k2,x1,x2), the










where the R&D eﬀort of the competitor is taken as given. Given this general form we compute












+[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hi(zi)dt + [Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hj(zj)dt.













+ [Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hi(zi) + [Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hj(zj)
 
. (15)





′(zi) + [Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]h
′
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1 − λu′(zi)[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]
u′(zi)
. (17)
Current gain from not investing an additional unit, i.e., −1 , must equal future gain from an
additional unit of investment which is inﬂuenced by the change of knowledge stock (through the











− λd[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)].
In the next step, we state the maximized Bellman equations from (15) as the Bellman equa-
tions where controls are replaced by their optimal values:
ρVi(s) = πi(s) − zi(s) +
∂Vi(s)
∂ki




+[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hi(zi(s)) + [Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hj(zj(s)). (18)
We now compute the derivatives with respect to the state variables ki using the envelope




































































hj(zj(s)) + [Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]αγk
α−1
j .
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∂
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1 − λu′(zi(xi + 1))[Vi(xi + 2,·) − Vi(xi + 1)]
u′(zi(xi + 1))
−






1 − λu′(zi(x−i + 1))[Vi(s) − Vi(x−i + 1)]
u′(zi(x−i + 1))
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1 − λu′(zi(xi + 1))[Vi(xi + 2,·) − Vi(xi + 1)]
u′(zi(xi + 1))
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1 − λu′(zi(x−i + 1))[Vi(s) − Vi(x−i + 1)]
u′(zi(x−i + 1))
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+ λ[Vi(x−i + 1) + Vi(xi + 1,·)]
 
hj(zj(s))






















+ λ[Vi(x−i + 1) + Vi(xi + 1,·)]
 
dqj(s). (25)
On the other hand we can use the maximized Bellman equations together with the ﬁrst order
condition and get
ρVi(s) = πi(s) − zi(s) +
1 − λ[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]
u′(zi)




+[Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hi(zi(s)) + [Vi(xj + 1,·) − Vi(s)]hj(zj(s)). (26)
B No Acquisition of Knowledge
Without knowledge acquisition, i.e., with γ = 0 and ∆i = xi − xj as the only state variable, the
maximized Bellman equations (26), (18) respectively, simplify to:
ρVi(∆i) = πi(∆i)−z(ui(∆i))+[Vi(∆i + 1) − Vi(∆i)]hi(ui(∆i))+[Vi(∆i − 1) − Vi(s)]hj(uj(∆i)).
(27)
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the envelope theorem and λ = 1 the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm i
yields
Vi(∆i + 1) − Vi(∆i) = ui(∆i)η−1. (28)
23Note that each R&D eﬀort is proportional to the incremental value that would result from










Vi(∆i + 1) = 1
ρ
 
πi(∆i + 1) − z(ui(∆i + 1)) − z
′(ui(∆i + 1))ui(∆i + 1)
− z′(u1(∆i))uj(∆i + 1)
 
. (30)
Using this in the ﬁrst order condition yields
ui(∆i)η−1 (ρ + ui(∆i) − uj(∆i + 1))
= πi(∆i + 1) − z(ui(∆i + 1)) − πi(∆i) + z(ui(∆i)) + ui(∆i + 1)η − (ui(∆i − 1))η−1uj(∆i).
(31)
As the ﬁrms are ex ante symmetric, ui(∆i) = uj(−∆i) holds. This yields the reduced form R&D
equations
ui(∆i)η−1 (ρ + ui(∆i) − ui(−∆i − 1))
= πi(∆i + 1) − z(ui(∆i + 1)) − πi(∆i) + z(ui(∆i)) + ui(∆i + 1)η − (ui(∆i − 1))η−1ui(−∆i).
(32)
For the special case of ∆i = 0, this simpliﬁes to
ui(0)η−1 (ρ + ui(0) − u1(−1))















+ ρ2 + u(1)2 − ρ. (34)
For ∆ > 0 we have π(∆+1)−z(u(∆+1))−π(∆)+z(u(∆)) = e−∆−1(1−e)+ 1
η (u(∆)η − u(∆ + 1)η)
while when ∆ < 0 the increase in proﬁt when moving one step ahead is zero, i.e., π(u(∆ +1))−
π(u(∆)) = 0. Using this we get the relations of optimal R&D stated in lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We restrict attention to non-ﬂuctuating pattern. That means for all
∆ > 0 : if u(∆) > u(∆ + 1) then u(∆ + 1) > u(∆ + 2) and vice versa. The same has to be true
for the follower, i.e., for all −∆ < 0 : if u(−∆) > u(−∆ − 1) then u(−∆ − 1) > u(−∆ − 2)
and vice versa. Hence, we are not able to rigorously prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium we
derive. However, economic intuitions for ﬂuctuating eﬀort do not exist when time preference
rate is set to zero.
From part 1 of Lemma 1, obviously u(0) > u(1) results.
To see how the eﬀort of the industry’s follower reacts on technological jumps we ﬁrstly analyze
the equation given in part 3 of lemma 1.
26For the special case η = 2 eﬀort is even strictly proportional to the incremental value.
27For the sake of readability we will suppress the identity of the ﬁrm where not necessary.
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2 − (u(−∆ + 1) − 1
2u(∆ − 1))
2}
= sign{u(−∆ + 1)u(∆ − 1) − u(−∆ − 1)u(∆)}.
Here, we have to distinct diﬀerent cases. Let us ﬁrst assume that u(−∆) > 1
2u(∆) ∀∆ > 0
(implying u(−∆ + 1) > 1
2u(∆ − 1) ∀∆ > 0). Then, we get
sign{u(−∆) − u(−∆ + 1)}
= sign{u(−∆ + 1)u(∆ − 1) − u(−∆ − 1)u(∆)}. (35)
This means eﬀorts for the follower are decreasing with the gap when u(−∆ + 1)u(∆ − 1) <
u(−∆ − 1)u(∆) holds. The opposite is true for u(−∆) < 1
2u(∆) ∀∆ > 0, i.e., follower’s eﬀort
increases if u(−∆ + 1)u(∆ − 1) > u(−∆ − 1)u(∆).
For ∆ = 1, these relations also compare the follower’s eﬀort with the eﬀort of a neck-and-neck
ﬁrm. Analyzing the situation for −∆ = −1 yields
sign{u(−1) − u(0)} = sign{u(0)2 − u(−2)u(1)}.
We already know that investment in neck-and-neck state is higher than eﬀort of a ﬁrm being
one step ahead, i.e., u(0) > u(1). This indicates that u(0)2 > u(−2)u(1) might hold, implicating




u(1) > u(0). If u(−2) is large enough to outweigh the diﬀerence between u(0) and u(1)
we have u(−1) > u(0). In that case the relation u(−2) > u(0) > u(−1) holds. That means the
optimal patterns shows some kind of ﬂuctuation.
We can illustrate the characteristics of the general equation (35) by means of the example of
∆ = 2. Equation (35) yields
sign{u(−2) − u(−1)} = sign{u(−1)u(1) − u(−3)u(2)}.
As we are not looking for ﬂuctuating patterns, we either have u(−3) > u(−2) > u(−1) or
u(−3) < u(−2) < u(−1). In the ﬁrst case, u(2) would have to be suﬃciently small to ensure
u(−1)u(1) > u(−3)u(2). In the case of u(−3) < u(−2) < u(−1), u(2) needs to be suﬃciently
large. Obviously, in either case do R&D eﬀorts for leader and follower go into opposite directions
when the gap increases. This clearly also holds true for the general case of ∆ > 2 and equation




u(∆−1). If now u(∆) > u(∆ − 1),
u(−∆ + 1) > u(−∆) > u(−∆ − 1) has to hold and vice versa.
Keeping in mind that leader’s and follower’s eﬀort move into opposite directions when the
gap increases, let’s now analyze the leader’s optimal eﬀort given in part 2 of the lemma. We can
directly see that for ∆ > 0
(u(∆) − u(−∆ − 1))











sign{(u(∆) − u(−∆ − 1))2 − (u(∆ + 1) − u(−∆ − 1))2}






holds. Again, we have to distinct diﬀerent cases. Let us ﬁrst assume u(∆) < u(−∆ − 1) and
u(∆) < u(−∆) ∀∆ > 0. In that case the assumption u(−∆) > 1
2u(∆) ∀∆ > 0 holds as well.
Besides, as we know leader’s and follower’s eﬀort move into opposite directions, the assumptions
implicate u(∆′) < u(−∆) ∀∆,∆′ > 0.
Then, we get
sign{u(∆ + 1) − u(∆)}





That means, we see increasing eﬀorts for leaders when u(−∆ − 1)u(∆ + 1) > u(−∆)u(∆ −





In the case of u(∆′) < u(−∆) ∀∆,∆′ > 0 the leader’s eﬀort can only be increasing if





holds. As in this case u(∆ + 1) > u(∆ − 1) holds, we have found an equilibrium
where the laggard’s increase in eﬀort with an increase in gap is not too large. Besides, it is
clear that beyond this u(−1) > u(0) > u(1) holds, since eﬀort is decreasing for the follower and
therefore u(−2) > u(0) > u(−1) cannot hold. The resulting pattern is that summarized in terms
of investment by proposition 1. Hence, we have shown that the described optimal behavior is
indeed an equilibrium.
To show that no other equilibria exist is a very comprehensive task and needs quantifying
analysis. Unfortunately we are not able to analytically show the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
C The Eﬀect of Knowledge
Proof of Proposition 3. With the simplifying assumption that investment in R&D does not in-


































































The rule shows how marginal proﬁt changes in a deterministic and stochastic way. While
there is a one-to-one mapping from marginal proﬁt to investment which allows some inferences
26about investment from (39), it would be more useful to have a rule for optimal investment itself.












u′(zi(s))2dzi(s) = (1 − η)(ηzi(s))
− 1
ηdzi(s). (40)
Due to the modeling approach only the technological gap and not the technological levels as
such matters for ﬁrms’ values, i.e., the eﬀect of the competitor moving one step forward is the





















































These rules describe the evolution of investment under optimal behavior for the ﬁrms. Growth
of investment depends on the right-hand side in a deterministic way on the typical sum of the
depreciation and time preference rate per marginal rate of knowledge acquisition plus the ”k-
terms” which capture the impact of uncertainty. To understand the meaning of these terms we
analyze whether investment jumps up or down, following a jump of the own or competitor’s
technology. Since η > 1 the term 1
u′(z1(s)) − 1










is negative if z1(s) < z1(x1 + 1,·). If this is the case, investment increases slower (or decreases
even faster) if the probability of a jump of the own technology due to a higher knowledge stock
is high. On the other hand investment increases faster (or decreases slower) if the probability of
a jump of the competitor’s technology due to his higher knowledge stock is high.
The dqxi-terms give discrete changes in the case of a jump in xi. When xi jumps and dqxi(s) =
1 (dqxj(s) = 0, i.e., there is no contemporaneous jump in xj) and dt = 0 for this small instant of











on the right hand side. This is positive as long as zi(s) < zi(xi + 1,·) which is consistent with
the deﬁnition of dzi(s) given by zi(xi + 1,·) − zi(s). Solving this for zi(s) interestingly yields
zi(s) = zi(xi + 1,·). Hence, optimal investment does not immediately react to a jump in the
industry’s state. This is the result stated in proposition 3.








ρ + δ − (ηzi(s))
1−η
η [Vi(xi + 1,·) − Vi(s)]







We can not determine the value of Φi(s), but we know it is always positive and from the ﬁrst
order condition we get
∂Φi(s)
∂ki = 0. Thus, Φ(·) is only a function of the technological gap ∆ and
the same function for both ﬁrms, i.e Φi(∆) = Φj(−∆). Hence, we can write Φ(∆i) ≡ Φi(∆).
27With this result it can directly be seen that more knowledge a ﬁrm has acquired the smaller is
the growth rate of optimal investment.
Furthermore, from (26) and with λ = 0 we can analyze the shape of Φ(∆). As the value
function inherits its shape from the proﬁt function, the value function will be bounded from
below and above and will converge to these bound for ∆ → −∞ and ∆ → ∞ respectively.
Hence,
∂(Vi(∆+1)−Vi(∆))
∂∆ is negative for high values of ∆ and positive for small (negative) values.
As the slope of the value function measures a leader’s incentive to innovate, this slope is
maximal around the neck and neck point since neck-and-neck ﬁrms perform R&D at a higher
intensity than industry leaders.
The maximized Bellman equations (26) hold for all optimal eﬀorts, especially at steady state
as well, i.e., when u(zj) − δkj = 0. In this case, for ∆ < 0 we have:
ρVi(s) = −zi(s) + [Φ(∆)]γkα
i − [Φ(∆ − 1)]γkα
j .
The right hand side can only be positive for positive Φ(∆) if Φ(∆) > Φ(∆−1) and therefore we
have
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ > 0 for ∆ < 0.
The derivative of the maximized Bellman equation (26) with respect to ∆ for ∆ < 0 using























































Here, we can see that the only critical value of ∆, i.e., a value where signs could possibly change,
is indeed at ∆ = 0.
We can now determine the derivative of the value eﬀect of a technological step ahead for
∆ > 0:
ρ
∂ (Vi(∆ + 1,ki,kj) − Vi(∆,ki,kj))
∂∆







































We know V (·) is approaching the upper bound for ∆ → ∞. Hence, for suﬃciently large
values of ∆, the second derivative of the value function and thus the ﬁrst derivative of Φ(∆) will
be negative. But even more, we see that the right hand side of equation (46) is negative for all
∆ > 0 in steady state with suﬃciently low knowledge stocks as e−∆−1(1 − e) < 0. Hence, the
value function’s inﬂection point has to be at ∆ = 0 and we have
∂Φ(∆)
∂∆ < 0 for ∆ > 0.
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